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Abstract
This study uses time-series cross-sectional logistic and OLS regressions to analyze data 
on foreign assistance and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine the impact of 
different methods of foreign aid on democracy and democratic characteristics in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Even though all foreign assistance has the end goal of promoting 
democratic growth, different aid targeted sectors have varying effects on democracy.  The 
research has found that aid targeting social infrastructure, specifically health and 
government sectors, in Sub-Saharan Africa has a substantial, positive effect on 
democracy and democratic characteristics while economic infrastructure aid has no 
effect.  This analysis could have an impact on future aid allocation by promoting aid 
specialization for social infrastructure.
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Introduction
Economic aid has played a critical role in Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of 
colonialism.  During the Cold War economic aid was tied to political and geographic 
factors.  For Western nations aid was given to those countries which opposed 
communism and were strategically located near a communist state, many times at the 
expense of the citizens.  Instead of foreign assistance being used for improving societal 
conditions it was typically used to increase the ruling party’s power through the military 
and personal wealth.  During the Cold War instilling capitalistic and democratic ideals 
within the recipient nations was almost of no concern, as Western nations openly 
supported harsh dictators exemplified by the U.S.'s lengthy support of Mobutu in Zaire. 
Economic aid to Africa changed greatly after the Cold War though as the spread of 
communism was no longer a threat, forcing Western states to reconsider foreign aid 
policy.  Since the Cold War aid has now become tied to democratic and liberal 
advancements within recipient states.  Western countries, especially the United States, 
France, and Great Britain, have invested large amounts in Sub-Saharan Africa with little 
hope that any of that will ever be paid back.  These nations though do have other 
advantages though such as the rich natural resources of some African nations and the 
hope that economic development will create a more favorable environment for 
international business.  These nations along with the World Bank and IMF have tied aid 
to difficult to measure goals so they can have some measure of how successful their 
investment is.  The research question arises then how successful is economic aid in 
fostering democratic changes within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The ability of economic aid to foster political changes is greatly contested.  Some 
believe that the aid does help by providing states the resources to enhance infrastructure, 
education, and other necessary improvements.  Others though find that the economic aid 
ends up falling into the hands of corrupt leaders who use it for personal gains or cause 
strife over who is in charge of dispersing the funds.  Most research was initially 
concerned with how the aid effected economic conditions within the recipient nations but 
more recently the push has been to understand the effects on governance.  Understanding 
the effect on governance provides a more useful indicator for the success of foreign aid 
by measuring the more significant and long term effect it can have on recipient states.
One of the biggest arguments about foreign aid concerns what methods of aid 
disbursement result in the greatest benefit to recipients.  The debate centers on a similar 
debate over the characteristics that work most effectively to instill democratic 
governance.  Some contend that assistance benefiting business and market institutions 
provides the greatest catalyst for democracy while others counter that assistance for 
social programs such as education or health achieve this best.  Currently foreign 
assistance tends to be granted in large quantities for multiple functions with the goal of 
development and easing the burdens of poverty.  The conversation then revolves around 
whether wide ranging or specialized aid results in the greatest recipient benefit.  Then if 
specialization is the best method the focus shifts back to the debate over economic or 
social program assistance.  
The purpose of the specialization is to pinpoint the conditions that allow for an 
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increase in government expenditures for integral functions such as basic education, 
sanitation, infrastructure, and health services.  The development of these functions should 
lead to a basic quality of life improvement through higher life expectancy, higher literacy 
rate, and eventually a more educated public.  Over time the advancements allow for an 
increase in information exchange, political participation, and other essential components 
of democratic states.  In determining which method of specialization best benefits 
democratization, donors can optimize their assistance so that they are reaching the 
greatest number of beneficiaries in the most desirable sectors.  
The analysis of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa must account for a multitude of 
factors identified through previous research.  This paper seeks to further the research by 
addressing the important arguments and mistakes of previous studies.  First, the analysis 
will account for time since to truly analyze foreign aid it needs to be determined how it 
affects governance over a significant time frame.  Yearly changes in both foreign aid and 
governance typically are small but compounded over time the results hopefully are 
substantial.  Next aid will be distinguished between social and economic infrastructure to 
determine whether assistance for one sector has a greater influence on democracy in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Identifying the differences between these forms of assistance will assist 
donors in adjusting their funds to the most beneficial sectors.  Finally social infrastructure 
assistance will be broken into its components to understand whether aiding certain facets 
of society are building democratic governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Democracy
Democracy has long been considered the most ideal government system for many reasons 
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such as promoting the most free and open society and best supporting economic growth 
and stability.  In being the most touted government structure, democracy is promoted 
around the world as the system to strive for in order to produce the best state.  As a 
developing region, Sub-Saharan Africa has been at the forefront of the conversation on 
instilling democratic regimes.  The Sub-Saharan states, not without trying, have struggled 
to introduce and maintain democracy since the end of colonialism except for a few 
nations such as Botswana.  In order to fully analyze democratization in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, an understanding is needed of the basic conditions considered ideal for supporting 
a democratic society.
First according to Schmitter and Karl (1991), “modern political democracy is a 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public 
realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their 
elected representatives.”1  This is the most basic definition of democracy but many also 
include aspects such as civil liberties, fair and free elections, and freedom of speech. 
Democratization constitutes one of the most important aspects of international relations 
for several reasons.  Democracy is considered the most stable form of government and 
most conducive to capitalism.  Another major consequence of democracy is the 
democratic peace theory, which holds that no democratic regimes have entered war 
against one another and thus never will.  
Certain characteristics of democracies are integral to their ability to maintain a 
stable government system and promote freedom and growth.  One aspect is a high degree 
of transparency which allows “interested citizens to observe policy choices, grand 
strategies, and major regime discontinuities in a timely way, as well as to see the sources 
1Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75.
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and intensity of support and opposition to specific commitments.”2  In modern 
democracies transparency is a necessary part of the system due to the right of the public 
to know the government's policies and intentions and the freedom of the press. 
Politicians within democracies openly voice their policies to the public leaving 
themselves open to the scrutiny of other politicians, the public and the media.  The 
openness of democracies is important because it gives the public the ability to make 
informed decisions and allows the market and businesses to adequately adjust to changes 
in policy.
Another important facet of democracies is stable succession of leadership and 
continuity of governance.  In democratic regimes the selection of senior officials is based 
on clear rules ensuring orderly succession permitting policies to develop within a sound 
domestic framework.3  Orderly changes in leadership limit instability and violence within 
a state because there is no question of legitimacy; leadership with questionable legitimacy 
is often met with strong public protest and sometimes force.  Political stability is also 
supported by a strong continuity of governance.  In enduring democracies a change of 
leadership does not result in complete overhaul of policies, services, and society.  Instead 
policy changes are fairly small with many longstanding policies typically weathering any 
regime change, even one that appears to be dramatically different from previous 
leadership.  The public knows that services provided in one regime will still be provided 
in the next and this knowledge of government continuance lowers legitimacy questions 
and promotes societal peace.
The next attribute of a democracy, public voice and government accountability, is 
2Charles Lipson. Reliable partners: how democracies have made a separate peace. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 14.
3 Ibid. p. 8.
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probably the most important insurance for a free and open society.  The public voice 
manifests itself in multiple forms: citizens freely expressing opinions through forums, 
protests, the media, and countless other methods; citizens electing representatives; and 
petitioning and voting for law changes.  The freedom of the people also promotes 
accountability as there are visible electoral incentives for leaders to keep their promises 
and consequences, what Lipson calls audience costs, for breaking promises to the 
electorate.4  Democratic leaders are constrained by the public because to get elected they 
must appeal to large constituencies preventing singular radical ideals from penetrating the 
government.  Once in power leaders must retain the public's confidence and will be 
punished for ineffective policies and abandoning election promises.  Voice and 
accountability along with the other key aspects of democracies are all necessary because 
without one the others cannot exist.
The key characteristics of democracies make it so appealing to citizens, business, 
and the international community as a whole.  As noted earlier democracies tend to best 
promote strong, annual economic growth.  This occurs through the establishment of 
conditions that support innovation, entrepreneurship, and again stability.  Citizens value 
democracy because it provides the best option for voicing their opinions, reducing 
violence, and offering social services that improve the quality of life.  Finally the 
international community supports democracy across the globe because of the economic 
and social benefits of the state but also because democratic governments interact 
peacefully with one another.5
If democracy with all of its argued benefits really is the end goal for states, which 
4    Lipson. p. 9.
5    Ibid. p. 1.
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this paper assumes it is, then it is important to understand the conditions for democratic 
governance.  The conditions can loosely be divided between social and economic which 
sets up the majority of the debate over what constitutes the ideal setting for democracy. 
This section focuses on the ideal conditions for democracy with some consideration given 
to the argument over the best situation for fostering democracy.  One common theme 
among democracy scholars is that a large, strong middle class is important for developing 
and maintaining democracy because it reduces “the proportion of the population that is 
susceptible to anti-democratic parties and ideologies and by increasing the proportion of 
the population that supports moderate pro-democratic parties.”6  The middle class is a 
moderately wealthy and educated group within a society which positions them perfectly 
to support democratic ideals.  The debate then is over whether economic developments or 
social developments provide the best mechanisms for promoting a middle class.
Proponents of economic conditions make the case that promoting a strong market 
economy has the greatest effect on democratization.  The argument is “capitalist 
economic development...produces a shift in the labor force from agriculture to industry 
and services [and] this shift increases the size of the urban middle class and the size of 
the urban working class which fosters the inauguration of democracy.”7  The emergence 
of a strong middle and working class leads to a demand for more social and political 
freedoms as well as welfare services.  Muller also brings up urbanization which is 
another condition for democratic changes as citizens living in urban areas have more 
interest in political institutions and have the greatest access to communication.  
The problem with arguing for the economic conditions is that it misses the inherent 
6 Muller, E. (1995). Economic Determinants of Democracy. American Sociological Review, 60(6), 967.
7 Ibid. 969.
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social causes of economic development.  Before a strong middle class can even emerge 
there must be in place some education system for people to move into the higher skilled 
professions.  At the most basic level is the need for a literate public which, Lipset 
contends, is one of the first prerequisites for democracy.8  Literacy is the most basic 
societal characteristic that is necessary for any government based on citizen participation 
because a citizen needs to at least be able to read ballots.  Also a literate citizen typically 
has some minimal informal education or at least the ability to comprehend basic 
governmental policies and functions.  For these reasons, a literate electorate is necessary 
for the beginnings of democratization.  Literacy also serves as a good measure of the 
social condition within a state as the higher the literacy rate the more likely the higher the 
development.  
A high literacy rate may serve as an entrance fee for adopting democratic 
governance but the development of a more educated populace improves the stability and 
progression of society.  Lipset puts the need for education best, that it “presumably 
broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, 
restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their 
capacity to make rational electoral choices.”9  Studying the influence of education though 
is tricky as different levels equate to varying levels of social, economic, and political 
development.  Public primary education serves as one of the best methods for promoting 
democracy within a society for a few reasons.  First, a population with high rates of 
primary education completion positively and directly relates to higher literacy rates 
making it one of the best methods for guaranteeing a literate public.  Also primary 
8 Lipset, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. 
9 Ibid. 79.
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education provides the perfect opportunity for civic education which furthers the ability 
of the public to more fully make informed political decisions.
As the population of a state moves to higher education levels the thought is that the 
country becomes more developed, economically, politically, and socially.  Edward 
Glaeser et. al. (2004) argues that not only do differences in schooling explain differences 
in democracy but even more generally in political institutions.10  Political institutions rely 
on highly educated individuals to operate effectively so it makes complete sense then that 
as these institutions are able to develop so too does democracy within the state.  Initial 
institutions in developing democracies must start off small because there is not the human 
capital present to manage a large political infrastructure, but as the population becomes 
more educated the institutions can evolve to fit the growing capabilities of the public.  So 
while primary education may be a perfect entrance into democracy higher levels of 
education allow democracy to advance as well as the economic and social conditions of 
the state.
Some studies suggest that education does not play an important role in fostering 
democracy and that it is the unknown fixed effects that are impacting both education and 
democracy.  The argument centers around the fact the relationship between democracy 
and education has used cross-sectional regression and this type of regression does not 
included fixed effects and within country variation.  Proponents of this argument suggest 
“the relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors 
influencing both education and democracy rather than a causal relationship.”11  The 
argument suggests that using a fixed effects model is the best method of regression to 
10     Glaeser, E., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do Institutions Cause 
Growth? . Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 271-303.
11 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., & Yared, P. (2005). From Education to Democracy?. The 
American Economic Review, 95(2), 48.
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ensure a robust model that takes into account the omitted within country variables.  The 
omitted within country variables cover various socioeconomic characteristics such as 
religion, language, social class, and ethnicity.
After education, the next important social condition is an overall healthy 
population.  The pursuit of health constitutes the most basic human need, a necessity for 
survival which trumps all other needs and desires.  In the least developed states much of 
the population suffers from malnutrition, deadly infectious diseases, and lack of basic 
medicines among numerous other health deficits.  A population that struggles to meet 
their most basic needs can never achieve significant development or democracy because 
before individuals can pursue existential needs, such as rights and freedoms, they must 
first not worry about survival.12  While education may contribute more to fostering 
development and democratic ideas, an individual must attain a lifestyle no longer fully 
encompassed by basic survival before even contemplating educational attainment.  Once 
health is no longer a concern of the general population, the public can begin to demand 
greater freedoms, rights, and accountability from the government.  
The final societal aspect to be explored here is the access to modern sanitation and 
water systems, which are essential to ensuring a healthy population.  A sanitation system 
is one of the best methods for lowering the spread of diseases by removing free standing 
waste that produces and harbors bacteria.  Basic running water is also important because 
in underdeveloped states the procurement of clean drinking water can be arduous and 
time consuming.  In a society where accessing clean water can be the longest daily task, 
individuals will never have the capacity to pursue great opportunities.  
12 Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. (2006). Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and 
Government in Economic Success. International Organization, 60(1), 205-243. 
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In international relations, democracy has long been considered the desired end goal 
for all states due to the vast array of benefits produced through it.  Domestically 
democracy provides the greatest level of individual freedoms and political participation 
while at the same time fostering a conducive environment for economic growth and 
stability.  The domestic positives also play a role on the international and regional level 
by lowering barriers to outside investment and trade and lowering the risk of interstate 
disputes.  The field of international relations is so concerned with democracy because of 
its considerable positives domestically which in turn lead to a more peaceful global 
political arena, a democratic peace.  Democratization has been occurring throughout the 
world in stages as regions develop the capacity to build a democratic system.
World democratization has been divided into waves.  Currently we are in the third 
or fourth wave depending on who is writing, and each has affected different regions of 
the world.  The current wave followed the fall of the Soviet Union and resulted in 28 
countries abandoning communism but some formed democracies while others 
dictatorships.13  One of the major issues concerning the current world situation is not only 
the transition to democracy but the difficulty of maintaining a stable democracy.  Many 
nations have been able to institute some democratic reforms, such as elections, but in 
Latin America and especially Sub-Saharan Africa they have either not lasted or continue 
the same authoritarian regime thinly veiled as a democracy.  
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa
Attempts at democratization have been an integral part of Sub-Saharan Africa post-
colonization but the region contains almost no stable, lasting democracies.  Scholars have 
13 McFaul, M. (2003). The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Postcommunist World. World Politics,54(2), 212-244. 
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pointed to multiple factors, both social and economic, contributing to Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s lack of democratic progress.  One is the limited size of the public with a stake in 
democracy due to widespread poverty, small middle class, and a disproportionally young 
and rural population.14  Another common factor is the high ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and common division of society into numerically and/or politically 
dominant versus minor social groups.15  Some examples of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and societal divisions are Rwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, which consists of over 100 different ethnic groups.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa has one of the most difficult societies for instituting and promoting democracy. 
What makes democratization in the region even more difficult is that the region does not 
fit any conventional development theories.
One major problem within Sub-Saharan African states is low education completion 
and even participation at all levels.  In order for a society to democratize there needs to be 
a literate public with some education but also a highly educated group to operate the 
administration.  During colonialism Africans made up only around 10-15% of public 
officials but following independence that number increased to almost completely for 
Africanized public administrations within a few years.16  This can clearly be seen as a 
positive since the public administration now consists of individuals vested in the interests 
of the state and devoted to its growth.  The problem though is the administrations 
following independence are comprised of only 10-15% with previous experience and 
14 Mattes, R., & Bratton, M. (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: awareness, performance, and 
experience. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 192-217.
15 Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203-1250. 
16 Mutahaba, Gelase. "Ecology and Public Administration in Africa: A Review of Their Relationships 
Since Independence." In The Ecology of public administration & management in Africa  . New Delhi: 
Vikas Pub. House, 1986. 1-17.
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about the same percent with a university education.  These early administrations lacked 
the necessary intellectual resources to operate effectively and provide the important 
activities for development.  The administrations have developed some since the end of 
colonialism but the administrations are still severely limited by patrimonialism.  The 
administrations were and some still today based on patrimonialism, the selecting of 
individuals who pay allegiance to the political leaders and represent the leaders' ethnic 
and tribal background.17  Patrimonialism constitutes one of the most severe forms of 
corruption that kept the administrations loyal to the leadership and not the people.
Proponents of economic development for promoting democracy stress a strong free 
market where private industry can grow and create jobs.  The problem though is western 
economies function well with unintruisive administrative action but a developing state 
cannot sustain itself or function freely without state intervention.  There are several 
reasons why the African state requires a high degree of intervention in the economy.  One 
major issue is limited market competition.  The major state production was agriculture 
which did not contribute much to the state's prosperity as most was for 
individual/community consumption, providing no taxable source.  Also many of the 
profit rich sectors of the state, namely the mining sector, are controlled by foreign entities 
which export almost all the goods and send the majority of the profits abroad.
Another developing region, Asia and especially China, was able to utilize its large 
entrepreneurial class and Latin American benefited from Catholic church activities to 
perform a variety of developmental functions.  The ability to tap into voluntary and 
nongovernmental organizations limited the financial and organizational burdens on the 
17 Alence, Rod. "Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa." The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 2 (2004). p. 165.
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state.  Africa though was not able to utilize such an important sector of the state.  For one 
African states lacked a substantial entrepreneurial class and there is little indigenous 
church-supported activities along with a distrust for the private sector and preference for 
state interventions.18
The next major economic issue is that there is little industrial production in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  When western states went through the most rapid stages of growth the 
administration was graced with the substantial industrial productivity.  Western states had 
unparalleled industrial growth that enabled the state to begin to play a larger role in 
society, through regulation and social programs, due to the substantial increase in 
revenue.  The issue with decolonial African states is there is almost no industrial 
production, the vast majority of the economy is comprised of agriculture, meaning there 
is a shortage of employment and state revenue. 
The last major issue is that the majority of the African states' GDPs come from 
foreign aid.  African states are not self-sustainable and must rely on this outside 
assistance to produce even basic services, which in many countries are still lacking. 
During the early 1980s it was discovered that the Sub-Saharan states that were already 
receiving copious amounts of aid would be faced with an even dire situation down the 
road as projections found that over 90% of all capital goods required for development 
would have to be imported, as well as the majority of food.19  The problem with this is 
that aid should be used less for running the state and more for creating state sponsored 
growth projects such as improving infrastructure and building societal establishments 
18 Umeh, Ogwo J., and Gregory Andranovich. Culture, development, and public administration in  
Africa  . Bloomfield, Ct: Kumarian Press, 2005. 91.
19 Adedeji, Adebayo. "Administrative Adjustments and Responses to Changes in the Economic 
Environment." In The Ecology of public administration & management in Africa  . New Delhi: Vikas 
Pub. House, 1986. 106.
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such as hospitals and schools.  The issue though was these states had considerable strides 
to make such as a 300% increase in meat production, an average annual growth rate of 
9.3% in energy production, and a more than triple increase in cereals production.20 
ODA and Economic Growth
Studies regarding economic growth have focused on the effect aid has on the 
recipient state’s GDP.  In most cases aid has had a positive effect on GDP but only under 
certain conditions.  Official Development Assistance (ODA) produces a positive effect on 
economic growth and human development in less developed countries.21  This is possible 
because ODA enters directly as government revenue which can be spent immediately on 
human development projects such as education.  The initial increase in human 
development spending causes an increase in human capital, and a more educated 
workforce or better transportation systems, which directly stimulates economic growth. 
 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT contributes to ECONOMIC GROWTH by 
increasing the capacity of the workforce, which in turn alters the organization and 
adaptability of production and the range and complexity of economic output. This 
contributes to increasing national income through, among other things, social 
capital and the policy environment.22
ODA may go straight to government revenues but that does not ensure that 
government spending will foster human development.  To be successful the government 
must put emphasis on human development policies because low priority will cause no 
human development and in some cases aid may be used against human development.23 
The aid can end up in the hand of the elites which can boost initial economic growth but 
20 Adedeji. 107.
21 Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. (2006). Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and 
Government in Economic Success.International Organization,60(1), 205-243.
22 Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. 205-243.
23 Ibid.
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will not be sustained. Along with high priority for human development governments must 
also have positive fiscal, monetary, and trade policies to properly utilize the aid.24 
Burnside and Dollar also found that in the place of poor policies aid had no effect on 
economic growth.  
Along with economic growth there are other economic effects foreign aid has on 
recipient nations.  Almost all of the literature agrees that foreign aid increases 
government spending but there are disagreements on whether it spurs economic growth. 
While government spending increases with foreign aid, government revenues tend to 
decrease because of lowering taxes or cutting other forms of government funding; 
undercutting the actual development of the recipient country.25  The literature on how 
foreign aid effects economic growth is quite extensive but there is serious debate as to 
what effect aid has on democratization.
ODA and Democracy
There is much literature that concludes that foreign aid has a positive effect on 
democratization.26  None of the studies, however, found that democratization happens in 
all cases of foreign aid.  Wright (2009) uses two variables to determine the effect aid has 
on democratization, size of the dictator’s coalition (chance of being elected in democratic 
election) and economic growth.27  If aid is to be withheld if a country chooses not to 
24 Burnside, Craig, David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." American Economic 
Review 90: 847–68.
25 Remmer, Karen. 2004. "Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government." American 
Journal of Political Science 48(1): 77–92.
26 Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa." International Organization 55: 123–
48.
Wright, J. (2009). How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.American 
Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 552-571.
DeWaal, A. (1997). Democratizing the aid encounter in africa.International Affairs, 73(4), 623-639.
27 Wright, J. (2009). How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.American 
Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 552-571.
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democratize the ruler has to make the decision of what to do.  Dictators that have a high 
chance of winning an election will choose to democratize because it will not change their 
status while dictators with small coalitions will choose to give up aid to maintain power.28 
Dictators choose aid because it is fungible and they can use it to pay off opponents, fund 
electoral campaigns, or simply pocket the money.29  
Other supporters of foreign aid argue that the current system is ineffective and 
instead aid needs to be funneled as government revenues.  In removing aid from the 
direct control of the recipient the donor state is determining where it will be spent which 
undermines the legitimacy of the recipient government.30  So aid needs to be 
democratized by allowing the recipient governments to handle the dispersion of funds 
which will increase accountability.  Increasing the accountability of the recipient 
governments pushes them to adopt democratic principles so as to continue receiving aid 
and possibly receive more aid with more democratization.31  De Waal’s conclusion is very 
important because it addresses the issue of whether the donor or the donor’s conditions 
have any effect on the recipient ability to democratize.  
While no opponents suggest that there are no positive effects of foreign aid, they do 
argue that aid is associated with a decrease in institutional quality and democratization or 
little to no effect, known as the perversity thesis.  The perversity thesis holds that foreign 
aid actually degrades the recipient’s institutions by eliminating their self sustainability 
because of their reliance on foreign aid.  The World Bank argued that the problem for 
Africa is poor governance, no accountability, corruption, and poor quality institutions 
28 Ibid.
29 Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinaya Swaroop, Min Zhu. 1998. "A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of 
Foreign Aid." World Bank Economic Review 12(1): 29–58.
30 DeWaal, A. (1997). Democratizing the aid encounter in africa.International Affairs, 73(4), 623-639.
31 Ibid.
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which are the prime reason for why aid diminishes democratic ideals.  They find that 
higher aid is associated with “larger declines in the quality of governance” in two ways.32 
The first is that aid can cause a weakening of institutions because of high transaction 
costs and time consuming projects.  Foreign aid is generally associated with human 
development projects such as education or infrastructure and the institutions in the 
recipient nations lack the ability to carry out the projects efficiently.  The second is that 
aid makes it difficult to overcome the collective action problems which hinder the 
capability of the state.   States receiving high amounts of foreign aid will begin to become 
dependent on the aid and the citizens will become accustomed to services without a 
personal cost making it especially difficult for the government to become self-reliant on 
internal sources of revenue such as taxes.  Brautigam (2000) also concludes that foreign 
aid can increase the power of the president in democracies which will degrade the 
democracy.33  Another negative effect on democratization is 
[a] large amount of aid can reduce the incentives for democratic 
accountability. When revenues do not depend on the taxes raised from citizens and 
business, there is less incentive for accountability [and] at the same time corrupt 
government officials will try to perpetuate their rent-seeking activities by reducing 
the likelihood of losing power.34 
 
Goldsmith (2001) found evidence contrary to the perversity thesis that showed a 
minor net plus in the ability for recipient states to govern.35  As noted there are some who 
find that foreign aid actual degrades the governance of a country but there is still much 
more evidence that movement towards democracy results from aid.
32 Brautigam, Deborah, Stephen Knack. 2004. "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa." Economic Development and Cultural Change 52: 255–85.
33 Brautigam, Deborah. 2000. Aid Dependence and Governance . Stockholm : Almqvist & Wiksell 
International.
34 Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo, Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. "The Curse of Aid." Journal of  
Economic Growth 13(3): 169–94.
35 Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa." International Organization 55: 123–
48.
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Another factor contributing to the type and amount of aid provided deals with the 
various donors.  Not only is the size of aid important but also who is giving it matters 
because donors may have different agendas and conditions.  One condition found is that 
multilateral donors have a preference for providing aid to less populous countries.  Where 
a divergence occurs is what indicator aid is based on, economic need or human 
development.  Regional development banks base aid on economic need while UN 
agencies base it on economic need as well as human needs.36  While some have 
concluded that corruption or low political freedoms will cause a donor to limit aid in 
general that does not hold true.  When taken all together there is no statistically 
significant difference between aid given to corrupt and non-corrupt governments.37 
Another major factor in donor aid is how it will affect companies working on aid funded 
projects in the recipient nations.  Recipient nations know that the company will put 
pressure on the donor to sustain aid allowing the recipient to undermine the conditionality 
tied to the aid.38  Multinational companies have strong influence on the donors, since 
sometimes they are based in the donor country, but have a different motive.  The 
competing motives are a significant roadblock to establishing aid conditionality.  Other 
factors influencing aid are geopolitical reasons dealing with establishing military bases 
and higher aid given to former colonial states.39 
Defining best practices for development assistance suffers from the same problems 
36 Neumayer, E. (2003). The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development 
Banks and United Nations Agencies. International Studies Quarterly, 47(1), 101-122.
37 Ibid.
Alesina, A., & Weder, B. (2002). Do Corrupt Governments receive less foreign aid?. The American 
Economic Review, 92(4), 1126-1137.
38 Villanger, E. (2004). Company Influence on Foreign Aid Disbursement: Is Conditionality Credible 
When Donors Have Mixed Motives?.Southern Economic Journal,71(2), 334-351.
39 Neumayer, E. (2003). The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development 
Banks and United Nations Agencies. International Studies Quarterly, 47(1), 101-122.
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as the debate over the most important aspects for successful democratization.  There are 
countless issues affecting aid and those issues are made up of countless other issues. 
Assistance comes in many forms, sizes, and channels and identifying those serves the 
important purpose of understanding some of the current limitations and successes.  The 
first issue is the specialization of the assistance, which is tied to the scope, goals, and 
donors.  Aid agencies tend to work in contrast to typical government agencies, as they 
“split their assistance between too many donors, too many countries, and too many 
sectors for each donor.”40  The agencies and recipients experience considerable 
disadvantages from a cluttered aid environment through high overhead costs for both 
donors and recipients, duplication, excessive time on the part of government ministers, 
and forfeit the ability to scale up successes.  The United States constitutes a perfect 
example of the specialization problem; there are two official agencies dedicated to 
foreign assistance but also more than 50 other government units providing assistance 
even though it is not their main purpose.41  All of these agencies have overlapping 
responsibilities with varying objectives that may or may not compete against one another. 
One of the biggest problems of foreign assistance is defining objectives and desired 
outcomes.  Most donors, whether nations or development NGOs, have the broad 
objective of ending poverty or, in even foggier language achieving development.  The 
dilemma though is “poverty and underdevelopment typically comprise a cluster of 
problems, and it is often not clear which particular problems of the intended beneficiaries 
40 Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign 
Aid. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,22(2), 38.
41 Brainard, Lael. 2007. "Organizing U.S. For- eign Assistance to Meet Twenty-First Century 
Challenges." In Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American 
Leadership, ed. Lael Brainard, chap. 2. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
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an aid agency should address.”42  Agencies attempt to accomplish their goals through a 
variety of methods aimed at improving the conditions of the recipients but often these 
methods fail to meet the demands of the recipients.  Sub-Saharan African states suffer 
from many public administration deficits and lack of public voice which significantly 
limits the beneficiaries' feedback to the aid agencies.43  The absence of useful feedback 
coupled with the underlying donor objectives, noted earlier, causes aid agencies to 
declare broad goals of development instead of fixing on the demands of the recipient.  
The lack of recipient feedback serves as the biggest contributor to many of the 
current issues with foreign assistance.  First giving up on the goal of development can 
lead to aid specialization that focuses on the demands of the beneficiary's society.  When 
freed from the development goal, foreign aid can be provided for those tasks with high 
demand: “to reduce malaria deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain 
roads, to provide scholarships to talented but poor students, and so on.”44  In working to 
answer the demands of the recipients, the donors are still working towards overall 
development but in gradual steps instead of trying to correct every issue all at the same 
time.  The broad development goal suffers so much because it ignores the connections 
between the underlying issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which reinforces the inability to provide feedback.  Sub-Saharan Africa lacks most of the 
beginning steps for development such as some education, a healthy population, and basic 
infrastructure so an aid agency trying to implement democratic or market institutions is 
going to fail.  Development and democratization occurs in a bottom up order not from “a 
42 Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign 
Aid. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,22(2), 32.
43 Easterly, W., & Pfutze, T. (2008). 32.
44  Easterly, W. (2007). Was Development Assistance a Mistake?.The American Economic Review,97(2), 
331. 
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strategic vision offered by a few experts”45 so focusing on the beneficiary's demands will 
allow for the recipient nation to progress naturally and through the will of its own actors. 
Currently aid agencies suffer from a lack of specialization causing them to stretch 
their objectives and lose sight of the issues facing recipient states which are the most 
important to achieving democracy.  Developing the beneficiary's social infrastructure is 
the most essential first step towards democracy since as the population's quality of life 
rises so too does the will and need of the people.  Assistance needs to be geared towards 
increasing the opportunities of the recipient population and less about transforming the 
recipient because forced change only causes more problems.  
The debate over democratization and foreign assistance produces more questions 
than answers as there is evidence supporting opposing arguments.  The two have strong 
connections, not just in foreign aid's ability to foster democracy, but also the perspective 
on democracy, whether driven by economic or social forces, carries over into the decision 
on the best methods of ODA.  This paper hopes to add to the discussion by analyzing 
foreign assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine not only its overall relationship 
with democracy but also discover any differences between social and economic 
infrastructure aid on governance and society.  The paper assumes the position that social 
conditions are most necessary for democratization so foreign assistance for social 
programs engenders democratic growth more so than economic infrastructure aid.  The 
following sections establish the framework of the analysis, statistical tests of the 
relationships, and interpretation of the results.
45  Ibid.
24
Hypotheses
Ha = The larger the sum of ODA per capita to Sub-Saharan African states the greater the 
probability of the state being democratic. 
H0a = ODA per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no effect on the probability of a 
state being democratic. 
Hb1 = The larger the sum of social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African 
states the greater the probability of the state being democratic. 
H0b1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no effect on 
the probability of a state being democratic. 
Hb2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan Africa has a greater positive 
effect on a state being democratic than economic infrastructure aid per capita due to its 
greater ability to improve the social standing of citizens.
H0b2 = There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid 
per capita in the degree of the effect on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Hc1 =  An increase in social infrastructure aid per capita in a Sub-Saharan African state 
produces a direct increase in percentage of voice and accountability in the state.
H0c1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no 
measurable relationship with the percentage of voice and accountability in the state.
Hc2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita has a larger positive effect on the percentage of 
voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan African states than economic infrastructure aid 
per capita. 
H0c2 =  There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid 
per capita in the magnitude of the effect on the percentage of voice and accountability in 
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Sub-Saharan African states.
Hd1 =  An increase in social infrastructure aid per capita in a Sub-Saharan African state 
produces a direct increase in percentage of political stability and the absence of violence 
in the state.
H0d1 = Social infrastructure aid per capita to Sub-Saharan African states has no 
measurable relationship with the percentage of political stability and the absence of 
violence in the state.
Hd2 = Social infrastructure aid per capita has a larger positive effect on the percentage of 
political stability and the absence of violence in Sub-Saharan African states than 
economic infrastructure aid per capita. 
H0d2 =  There is no measured difference between social and economic infrastructure aid 
per capita in the magnitude of the effect on the percentage of political stability and the 
absence of violence in Sub-Saharan African states.
Operationalization and Conceptualization
Time Frame
Two different time frames are used for the analysis, 1970 to 2008 and 2002 to 2009. 
The varying time frames allow for multiple analyses of the effects of ODA in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study is the state, more specifically 42 Sub-Saharan 
African states.  
Data
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Date for the analysis is provided by the Polity IV project and the World Bank's 
African Development Indicators.4647
Dependent Variable: Polity and Governance Indicators
The binomial dependent variable for democracy in the recipient nations will be 
determined from the Polity IV Project.  The Polity IV Project is made up of a 21 point 
scale with values ranging from -10 to +10 (democracy= +6 to +10, anocracy= -5 to +5, 
autocracy= -6 to -10).  The Polity IV score is found by subtracting the democracy (0-10) 
score by the autocracy score (0-10).  The scores are composed of multiple factors that 
make up a state's polity. First is the presence of institutions and processes where citizens 
can express effective preference for policies and leaders.  Second is the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on executive power.  Third is the guarantee of civil liberties 
to all citizens.  The score is specifically determined by the combination of four measures: 
competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness 
of executive recruitment (XRCOMP and XROPEN), and constraints on executive power 
(XCONST).  In order to simplify the model the Polity IV score was used to create a 
binomial variable to indicate whether the regime was a democracy by coding all Polity IV 
scores of +6 or greater as 1 to indicate the state was a democracy.  It is possible to run an 
OLS regression with the Polity IV score, an ordinal variable, but for this analysis simply 
identifying the statistical significance and direction of the relationship between foreign 
assistance and democracy is sufficient.
Democracy 02-09  Count Percent
Non-Democratic 229 65.06
46  Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2010. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2010. Version p4v2010e [Computer File]. College Park, MD: Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
47  World Bank. World Bank Africa Database 2010 [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank [Producer and 
Distributor], 2011.
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Democratic 123 34.94
The Polity IV score is useful for the initial analyses of overall foreign aid, the social 
and economic aid aggregates, and the breakdown of social aid because it allows for a 
simple method for representing the polity of a state and its change over time.  There are 
considerably more non-democratic states than democratic states from 2002 to 2009, on 
page 62-64 you can find a table of each democratic country by year. It does have 
limitations though, the binomial dependent variable prevents an OLS regression which 
would provide a much deeper analysis.  The biggest loss is the inability to quantify the 
effect each independent variable has on democracy.  While an interval or ratio 
measurement would have been ideal, the Polity IV score serves as the only accessible 
indicator for democracy during the extended time frame.
The OLS regressions will use governance indicators provided by the World Bank 
for the dependent variable instead of the Polity IV score.  The World Bank provides a 
percentage for voice and accountability, political stability/absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption starting in 1996.  Voice 
and accountability and political stability/absence of violence are used in separate analyses 
to determine the effect various types of ODA have in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Voice and 
accountability measures “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media.”48  Political stability and the absence of violence is measured by the 
World Bank according the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means.”49  The use of percentages provides the 
48  World Bank. World Bank Africa Database 2010 [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank [Producer and 
Distributor], 2011.
49  Ibid.
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ability to use a time-series cross-sectional OLS regression, which as noted earlier is the 
ideal method.  The rankings though do not provide the same measurement as the Polity 
IV since they do not directly indicate whether a state is a democracy.  The rankings do 
serve as a proxy for democracy as these are both components of a stable democracy with 
a higher ranking expressing a more democratic or free state.
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Voice and Accountability 31.19 20.05 0.95 77.4
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Political Stability/Nonviolence 32.99 22.36 0 89
The ability to directly represent the polity of a state is not the most important aspect 
of the study to demonstrate the ability of various types of aid to foster democracy.  The 
measured effect on the chosen rankings measures the capability of aid in cultivating the 
characteristics integral to fostering democracy.  Voice and accountability measures the 
public's ability to freely participate in their national government and the degree to which 
the government represents the will of the people.  Political stability and the absence of 
violence is the other important dependent variable because it captures the broader picture 
of the government and state.  Maintaining political stability is key for any emerging 
democracy but especially important in Sub-Saharan Africa where there exist substantial 
societal divisions.  A continued political stability ensures smooth government transitions, 
limited corruption, and overall proper government functioning.  
Independent Variable 1: ODA per Capita
The data for ODA per capita is provided from the World Bank database and is 
measured in current U.S. dollars.  ODA per capita is preferable to net ODA as it indicates 
the amount of aid per person accounting for population differences.  
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Independent Variable 2: Aggregate Indicators for Social Infrastructure and 
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita 
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Social per Capita 23.11 17.55 1.55 143.78
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Economic per Capita 7.95 28.95 0 507.49
The amount of aid provided for social infrastructure and services is generated by 
taking the World Bank's measurement for gross ODA disbursement for social 
infrastructure and services over the population.  The indicator accounts for all aid 
provided for education, health, population programs, water supply and sanitation, and 
government and civil society from DAC donors in current U.S. dollars.  The amount of 
aid for economic infrastructure is generated the same way but is the aggregate of aid 
provided for transport and storage, communications, energy, banking and financial 
services, and business and other services.  These aggregates capture the ability of aid 
provided for different sectors to improve prospects for democracy.  The aggregates were 
chosen because they represent the continued debate between whether economic or social 
characteristics more greatly cultivate democracy.
Independent Variable 3: Micro Indicators of Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita 
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Along with meta indicator for social infrastructure aid, a set of micro indicators are 
used to break down the components of the meta variable.  The micro indicators are ODA 
distributed for various sectors within society (variables and descriptions can be found in 
Table 1 below).  The micro variables make up the aggregate Social Infrastructure Aid 
variable and will be used to determine if there are differing relationships among sector 
specific social aid and the dependent variables.  The analysis of the micro variables 
effects provides reasoning behind sector specialization of aid to those areas where it 
causes the largest positive gains. 
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Table 1
Variable Name Description
Education This is the aggregate total for education level unspecified.
Government and Civil Society
Health This is the aggregate total for general health and basic health.
Water Supply and Sanitation
This is described as economic and development policy/planning; 
public sector financial management; legal and judicial development; 
general administration; strengthening civil society; elections; human 
rights; free flow of information and women's equality organisations 
and institutions. 
Population Programs and Reproductive 
Health
This is described as population policy and administrative 
management; reproductive health care; family planning; STD control 
including HIV/AIDS and personnel development for population and 
reproductive health. 
This is described as water resources policy and administrative 
management; water resources protection; water supply and 
sanitation - large systems; basic drinking water supply and basic 
sanitation; river development; waste management/disposal and 
education and training in water supply and sanitation. 
Control: GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita serves as a major economic control for the analysis.  It will control 
for whether or not it is a country's own economic capacity fueling governance.  GDP per 
capita is provided in current U.S. dollars from the World Bank.
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
GDP per Capita 1453.42 2767.28 85.54 28102.53
Control: Urbanization X Population Density
The combination of urbanization and population density accounts for the proximity 
citizens have to one another which, affects multiple factors in society such as 
communication and ability to demonstrate.  In the least developed countries, urbanization 
is typically seen as a factor for democratization because urban populations have greater 
access to information, political participation, and mobilization.  Many of these states 
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Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Education Aid per Capita 5.86 5.95 0.1 44.24
     
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Government Aid per Capita 5.12 7.87 0.26 131.27
     
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Health Aid per Capita 3.74 2.88 0 19.1
     
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Water/Sanitation Aid per 
Capita 2.14 2.36 0 13.88
     
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Population Assistance per 
Capita 4.54 10.35 0 120.9
began as highly rural but over time urbanized and this change needs to be controlled for 
in the analysis.  Population density is combined because it adds the extra dimension of 
overall closeness of the population.  The two variables cannot be used independently 
either because of multicollinearity issues.
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Population Density X 
Urbanization 2750.4 4212.93 77.34 26725.33
Control: Employment to Population Ratio
The final control measures the percentage of the population employed.  The data are 
provided from the World Bank database and identifies the percentage of the population 
18 and older employed within the state.  Employment to population ratio controls for the 
effect employment has on governance as the higher employment is the less prevalence of 
instability and the greater the ability of citizens to participate in government.
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Employment to Population 65.79 11.55 36.5 84.8
Variable/Data Limitations
As discussed in the literature review there are many societal conditions that affect 
governance both universally and specific to Sub-Saharan Africa.  In analyzing the effect 
of foreign assistance on democracy, these societal conditions need to be adequately 
controlled for to ensure the most robust models.  Some of the most important variables 
are controlled for in the regression: GDP per capita, Urbanization and Population density, 
and employment to population ratio; but there are also many unaccounted for societal 
variations as well.  The most apparent are: literacy rate, average amount of education, the 
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health of the population, measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, accessibility to 
running water and sewage systems, telephone access, access to information sources 
(radio, newspapers, television), access to paved roads, access to electricity, and countless 
other variables.  While it would be ideal to include an indicator for all of these variables, 
the reality is measures for these indicators do not exist or are severely limited for Sub-
Saharan Africa.  For example data on literacy rates are only available for some Sub-
Saharan states and even then normally only for one year.  The lack of quality societal 
level data out of Sub-Saharan Africa is not surprising though as there is little structure in 
place to quantify the measures.  The forceful exclusion of known controls is cumbersome 
but also piques the interest as the presence of so many unknowns ensures the analysis can 
always evolve.  The fixed effects of each model helps account for these unmeasured 
effects by assuming there are unchanging effects within a state that may change between 
states.
Methodology
In analyzing the effect of ODA on governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, three models 
will be used to account for multiple factors.  All models will use a time-series cross-
sectional multivariate fixed effects regression.  Models 1, 2, and 5 will use a logistic 
regression while models 3, 4, and 6 will use OLS regression.  While differing in a few 
ways, each model will most importantly be assessing ODA's effect on 
governance/democracy while controlling for various state characteristics such as GDP per 
capita and population density.  The table below provides all of the necessary information 
for each model.
Table 2: Model 
Specifications Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Type of Analysis
Time-Series 
Cross-
Sectional 
Logistic 
Regression 
FE
Time-Series 
Cross-
Sectional OLS 
Regression FE
Time-Series 
Cross-
Sectional OLS 
Regression FE
Time-Series 
Cross-
Sectional OLS 
Regression FE
Time-Series 
Cross-Sectional 
OLS Regression 
FE
Panel State State State State State
Time 1970-2008 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009
Dependent Variable
Binomial 
Democracy 
Variable
Voice and 
Accountability 
Ranking
Political 
Stability and 
No Violence 
Ranking
Voice and 
Accountability 
Ranking
Political 
Stability and No 
Violence 
Ranking
Main Independent Variables
ODA per 
Capita
Aid for Social 
Infrastructure 
per Capita, Aid 
for Economic 
Infrastructure 
per capita
Aid for Social 
Infrastructure 
per Capita, 
Aid for 
Economic 
Infrastructure 
per capita
Micro Level 
Aid Indicators
Micro Level Aid 
Indicators
Controls
GDP per 
Capita, 
Urbanization 
X Population 
Density
GDP per 
Capita, 
Urbanization X 
Population 
Density, 
Employment to 
Population 
Ratio
GDP per 
Capita, 
Urbanization 
X Population 
Density, 
Employment 
to Population 
Ratio
GDP per 
Capita, 
Urbanization 
X Population 
Density, 
Employment 
to Population 
Ratio
GDP per Capita, 
Urbanization X 
Population 
Density, 
Employment to 
Population Ratio
The first model answers the introductory question of whether ODA even has an 
effect on democracy.  The reason for using the longer time frame is to increase the 
number of observations as much as possible to improve the quality of the analysis.  The 
rest of the models will answer the deeper question of what types of aid are actually 
contributing to improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa and possibly whether some forms of 
aid degrading democracy.  All tests for the quality of the data and regressions have been 
conducted to ensure all regression assumptions are met.
Data Analysis
Model 1: Analysis of ODA per Capita on Democracy, 1970-2008
The first model serves as a preliminary analysis of official development assistance 
on democracy from 1970 to 2008.  A time-series cross-sectional logistic regression was 
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used to assess whether ODA has had any effect on democracy over an extended time 
period using the binomial democracy variable.  The results show that ODA per capita 
does have a statistically significant effect on democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa when all 
other variables are held constant.  GDP per capita is also statistically significant at the 
99% level when all other variables are held constant while the combined variable 
measuring Urbanization and Population Density is not statistically significant.   
Table 3: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 1970-2008
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
ODA per Capita .024**
 (.004)
GDP per Capita .005**
 (.001)
Urbananization X Population Density -.000
 (.000)
Observations 717
Groups 39
LR Chi-Squared 103.92**
Log-Likelihood -271.37
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)
Both ODA per capita and GDP per capita have a statistically significant positive 
effect on democracy in the analysis, which matches previous research.  The logistic 
regression does not provide a quantity for the measured effect the independent variables 
have on democracy but the coefficients can be compared for degree of effect as each is 
measured on the same scale of dollars per capita.  In this regression ODA per capita has 
almost 5 times the effect on democracy than GDP per capita (.024 to .005 respectively). 
ODA's greater effect on democracy demonstrates how not only ODA does have a positive 
36
influence but also provides the strongest change on governance among the measured 
variables.  While the results align with previous research it is important to first show the 
relationship because the rest of the analysis is worthless if the relationship does not exist.
Model 2: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Democracy,  
2002-2009
Model 2 measures the effect Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid has on 
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The analysis uses the same binomial democracy 
variable as model 1 so while the results indicate statistically significant relationships, 
they do not provide as substantive an interpretation as the OLS regressions.  As the table 
below shows Social Infrastructure Aid has a positive, statistically significant relationship 
with democracy in Sub-Saharan African states when all other variables are held constant. 
Economic Infrastructure Aid does not have a statistically significant effect on democracy, 
which supports the hypothesis that Social Aid has a positive effect on democracy in Sub-
Saharan Africa and a greater effect than Economic Aid.  
Both Urbanization/Population Density and Employment to Population Ratio are 
statistically significant as well.  Employment to Population does have a rather large effect 
but is in the negative direction which indicates that the more employed the population is 
the less likely a country is to be democratic in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The results of the 
first two models have so far supported the hypotheses and warrant additional analysis to 
determine what facets of a democratic society the aid is effecting to cause the 
relationship.   
Table 4: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-2009
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita .439**
 (.103)
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Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita .213
 (.140)
GDP per Capita -.000
 (.001)
Urbananization X Population Density .001*
 (.000)
Employment to Population -.313**
 (.083)
Constant 2.48
 (5.88)
Observations 292
Groups 42
Chi-Squared 57.78**
Log-Likelihood -59.78
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)
Model 3: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Voice and 
Accountability, 2002-2009
The scatter plots on this page and the 
next present the relationship between 
Social and Economic Infrastructure 
Aid and Voice and Accountability.  As 
the graph to the left shows, there is 
clearly a visible relationship between 
social aid and the voice and 
accountability ranking.  As graph 2 shows there is not quite as tight of a relationship 
between economic aid and voice and accountability.  The data points are not clustered in 
a way that would indicate a significant relationship between the two especially with there 
being clusters that fall outside of the main grouping.
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Model 3 is weighted by 
population size to correct for 
heteroskedesticity since there 
was higher error variance at 
lower population sizes (see 
Appendix pg. ) and the results 
from the regression can be seen 
on the next page.  The results support the hypothesis that there is a positive, statistically 
significant relationship between Social Infrastructure Aid and Voice and Accountability in 
Sub-Saharan Africa when all other variables are held constant.  The model indicates for 
every $1 per capita increase in Social Infrastructure Aid the Voice and Accountability 
ranking increases by .1 percentage point when all other variables are held constant. 
While an increase of .1 percentage points may seem insignificant, but a $10 per capita 
increase in Social Infrastructure Aid would yield a 1 percentage point increase.  Also the 
interpretation needs to take into account the effect over time as a onetime $10 per capita 
increase in aid would lead to a 10 percentage point increase over a decade.  An increase 
of 10 percentage points from just Social Infrastructure Aid is quite considerable and when 
coupled with other variables increasing Voice and Accountability a Sub-Saharan state can 
move closer to a free, democratic society rapidly over time.
Table 5: Multivariate OLS Regression on Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-
2009
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita .103**
 (.034)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita .172
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The only other statistically significant variable is the Employment to Population 
Ratio (-.426), the negative coefficient goes against the expected outcome though.  The 
other main independent variable, Economic Infrastructure Aid, is not statistically 
significant which supports the second part of model that Social Infrastructure Aid has a 
greater effect on Voice and Accountability than Economic Infrastructure Aid.  A final 
interesting observation is that GDP per capita is not significant in Model 2 but was in the 
longer time frame Model 1.  
Model 3 is also a strong predictor of the change in Voice and Accountability which 
provides even more strength to the estimates.  The model is explaining 97% of the 
variance in Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is very high but not 
unexpected.  The fixed effects model automatically accounts for invariant measures 
within each country such as ethnicity.
Model 4: Analysis of Social and Economic Infrastructure Aid on Political Stability  
and Non-Violence, 2002-2009
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Model 4 is very similar to Model 3 
except the dependent variable is now 
Political Stability and the Absence of 
Violence.  This model though is not 
weighted by population as there was no 
heteroskedesticity to correct.  The two 
graphs visualize the relationship between 
the main independent variables and Political Stability and the Absence of violence.  As 
can be seen both indicate a possible positive relationship.  The graph for Social 
Infrastructure aid indicates a possibly 
stronger relationship than Economic 
Infrastructure aid.  The only way to fully 
know the relationship though is from the 
regression results.
As the results show none of the independent variables had statistically significant 
effect on the percentage ranking for Political Stability and the Absence of Violence.  Not 
only did none of the variables have a statistically significant effect but the model as a 
whole did not meet the 95% threshold.  Social Infrastructure Aid is in the positive 
direction which was hypothesized, also while it did not meet the 95% probability cut off 
it did fall within the 90% confidence interval.  
Table 6: Multivariate OLS Regression on Political Stability and Non-Violence in Sub-Saharan States, 
2002-2009
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
Social Infrastructure Aid per Capita .067
 (.036)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita -.042
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 (.111)
GDP per Capita .000
 (.000)
Urbananization X Population Density -.000
 (.000)
Employment to Population .274
 (.247)
Constant 14.45
 (16.24)
Observations 299
Groups 42
Adj. R-squared .91
Root MSE 6.75
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)
Model 4 clearly is not as strong as Model 3 but it does still offer some insights when 
comparing the results of all previous models.  One important take-away is Social 
Infrastructure Aid does have a statistically significant positive effect on democracy in 
Sub-Saharan African states as shown in Model 2.  Also Economic Infrastructure Aid does 
not have a statistically significant relationship to democracy and even if it did Social Aid 
still has a greater effect.  Model 3 demonstrated Social Infrastructure Aid has quite a 
profound effect on the Voice and Accountability of Sub-Saharan African states while 
Model 4 provides evidence that Social Infrastructure Aid has little to no effect on the 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence in the same states.  The next section will 
break out the Social Infrastructure aggregate to determine if certain facets of social aid 
are driving the positive relationship with democracy and Voice and Accountability.
Model 5: Analysis of Components of Social Infrastructure Aid on Democracy,  
2002-2009
The first analysis on the facets of Social Infrastructure Aid focuses on the effect each 
aid component has on the binomial democracy variable.  The hope is to more fully 
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understand the relationship between social aid and democracy by determining whether 
different aspects have different effects.  The results of the analysis, in the table on the 
next page, indicate that only aid provided for population programs and reproductive 
health has a statistically significant relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan African 
countries when all other variables are held constant.  The results are fairly unexpected as 
the assumption was that aid provided for education, government, or health would be 
contributing the most to the positive relationship between social infrastructure aid and 
democracy.  
Employment to population ratio is the only other statistically significant variable and 
again the relationship is negative with democracy (-.347) when all other variables are 
held constant.  The rest of the results closely mimic those from model 2 with the most 
significant being the economic infrastructure aid still does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Finally the model as a 
whole is robust with a statistical significance at the 99% confidence level.   
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Model 6: Analysis of Components of Social Infrastructure Aid on Voice and 
Accountability, 2002-2009
The final model provides another level of understanding of Social Infrastructure Aid 
by analyzing the sector specific aid effects on voice and accountability.  The hope is to 
determine at an even more granular level how different types of Aid affect voice and 
accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Model 6 tests the relationship between voice and 
accountability and aid provided for education, government and civil society, health, 
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Table 7: Multivariate Logistic Regression on Democracy in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-2009
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
Education Aid .179
 (.237)
Government and Civil Society Aid .461
 (.305)
Health Aid .419
 (.318)
Water and Sanitation Aid .144
 (.739)
Population Programs Aid .786**
 (.298)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita .217
 (.164)
GDP per Capita -.000
 (.001)
Urbananization X Population Density .001*
 (.000)
Employment to Population -.347**
 (.103)
Constant 7.29
 (6.59)
Observations 290
Groups 42
Chi-Squared 39.87**
Log-Likelihood -58.53
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)
population programs, and water/sanitation.  The aggregate Economic Infrastructure Aid 
will continue to be measured for its effect on voice and accountability.  The analysis 
resembles model 3 except Social Infrastructure Aid is substituted for its five parts and 
again is weighted by population size to correct for heteroskedesticity. 
The results shown in the table on the next page provide some very interesting and 
unexpected relationships.  The most striking is the statistically significant, negative 
relationship between education aid and voice and accountability (-.646) when all other 
variables are held constant.  The coefficient indicates that for every $1 per capita increase 
in aid for education the voice and accountability ranking drops by .646 percentage points 
so taken over 10 years the $1 per capita increase would drop the voice and accountability 
in a Sub-Saharan African state by 6.5 percentage points.  It was expected education aid 
would have the greatest positive effect on voice and accountability among all of the 
aspects of social aid so this result is quite striking, deserving future research.  
Aid for government and civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa is also statistically 
significant but in the positive direction, indicating a positive relationship between the aid 
and voice and accountability when all other variables are held constant.  Substantively a 
$1 per capita increase in aid provided for government and civil society yields an .161 
percentage point increase the voice and accountability ranking when all other variables 
are held constant.  Aid provided for the health sector has the greatest statistically 
significant effect on voice and accountability out of all aspects of social aid.  When aid 
provided for the health sector increases by $1 per capita, voice and accountability rises by 
.829 percentage points when all other variables are held constant.  So again expanding 
that increase to either $10 per capita or $1 per capita over 10 years would yield an 8.3 
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percentage point increase in the voice and accountability of a Sub-Saharan African state 
when all other variables are held constant.
Table 8: Multivariate OLS Regression on Voice and Accountability in Sub-Saharan States, 2002-
2009
Independent Coefficient
Variables (Standard Error)
Education Aid -.646**
 (.198)
Government and Civil Society Aid .161**
 (.058)
Health Aid .829**
 (.203)
Water and Sanitation Aid .326
 (.302)
Population Programs Aid -.003
 (.074)
Economic Infrastructure Aid per Capita .157
 (.098)
GDP per Capita .000
 (.000)
Urbananization X Population Density -.000
 (.000)
Employment to Population -.238
 (.181)
Constant 47.21**
 (11.85)
Observations 290
Groups 42
Adj. R-squared .96**
Root MSE 3.07
**p<.01 (two tailed)
*p<.05 (two tailed)
The model as a whole is statistically significant from zero and very robust.  The 
adjusted R-square indicates the model explains 96% of the variance in voice and 
accountability.  Clearly aid provided for the health sector is having a dramatic positive 
impact on the voice and accountability of Sub-Saharan African states with government 
and civil society having a more minimal positive effect.  The negative relationship 
between education aid and voice and accountability is disconcerting though since 
improving the education of a state was thought to be a good method for promoting 
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democratic ideals.  
Interpretation of Results
The results of the analysis on foreign assistance and democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa lead to some interesting conclusions.  The results of the first model came as little 
surprise, as it was expected, based on countless previous studies, the hypothesis that 
larger amounts of ODA per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa positively correlates to 
democratic governance.  As shown in previous literature, ODA has consistently stood up 
to statistical tests on its ability to affect government systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
globally.  While the model just upheld previously supported theories, it was still essential 
for providing the beginning framework for the argument.  Also the results did produce 
one interesting insight, both ODA per capita and GDP per capita have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa meaning each 
works together to increase democracy.  The difference in magnitudes indicates that Sub-
Saharan African states do not currently possess national economic conditions to 
independently improve their status. Sub-Saharan African states rely on ODA to 
compensate for the limited government revenues from within the state and without these 
monetary infusions the government would most likely be incapable of providing services. 
If anything else this model further demonstrates the inability of most Sub-Saharan 
African states to operate autonomously from foreign assistance to the point that ending 
assistance would incur a complete collapse of the state.
Where model 1 provides little new insights, model 2 is a whole different story.  The 
relationship between democracy and different forms of aid has received considerably less 
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attention, mostly due to the lack of data until recently.  The regression results supported 
the hypotheses that social infrastructure aid has a positive relationship with democracy as 
well as that social infrastructure aid has a greater effect on democracy then economic 
infrastructure aid.  The results could not have better reinforced the proposition that 
assistance for social programs is the best method for cultivating democracy in Sub-
Saharan African states.  The fact social infrastructure aid has the greatest positive effect 
on democracy should not be surprising since this paper accepts the notion that social 
conditions play the biggest role in democratization.  The complete absence of a 
relationship between economic infrastructure aid and democracy is somewhat surprising 
though as it was expected to have some effect just less than social infrastructure aid. 
Not only does social infrastructure aid have a statistically significant positive effect 
on democracy but also on the voice and accountability percentage ranking.  This positive 
relationship with voice and accountability provides a possible explanation for social 
infrastructure aid's ability to increase democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Voice and 
accountability is an important characteristic of democracies as well as being necessary for 
the public to demand government and societal reforms.  Through increasing voice and 
accountability, social infrastructure aid builds an integral component in Sub-Saharan 
African societies for improving their personal rights and freedoms.  Improving voice and 
accountability appears to be social infrastructure aid's main contribution to democracy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as it has no effect on political stability and the absence of violence. 
The lack of a relationship with political stability and the absence of violence demonstrate 
that while social infrastructure aid can improve citizens' capacity to express interests to 
the government, it cannot improve alter the societal and political divisions hindering 
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stability and fostering violence. 
Social infrastructure aid's ability to improve the voice and accountability and in turn 
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to certain sector aid specialization. 
The analysis of the different social sector aids on the binomial democracy variable does 
not provide much insight and taken by itself it appears none of the social sector specific 
aids leads the influence.  Instead it is the combination of all sectors causing the 
relationship.  The deeper analysis of social infrastructure aid's segments on voice and 
accountability yields much richer and surprising conclusions into the ability to affect 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The most surprising result is the negative influence 
of education sector assistance on voice and accountability, which goes against the 
expected positive relationship.  As noted earlier education is considered vital to crafting 
democratic governance in states so education assistance's adverse effect on voice and 
accountability must be attributed to some other aspects in Sub-Saharan African society.  
While social infrastructure aid's positive relationship is not tied to education 
assistance, the investigation into the other social sector aids does provide explanations 
into the relationship through conclusions about Sub-Saharan African society.  The most 
striking results are the high magnitude positive relationship between health program 
assistance and voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa which more than 
compensates for the negative effects from education assistance.  Initially the result was 
surprising until it was applied to the larger context of Sub-Saharan African society and 
democratization.  As mentioned in the literature review a healthy population is highly 
important for a developing state because basic health needs must be overcome before a 
population can progress to more metaphysical needs.  Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from 
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the worst health issues in the world such as multiple deadly epidemics and limited if not 
nonexistent access to basic healthcare and medication.  In a society afflicted by such 
severe health concerns it comes as no surprise health assistance currently contributes 
most to Sub-Saharan development as it addresses the most pressing demands.  
The whole purpose of foreign assistance is to drive recipient's development by 
targeting the most urgent and lowest stage development impediments and then move onto 
the higher stages.  Right now foreign assistance has gotten ahead of itself by focusing on 
multiple development stages, most important here is education, while the recipient's 
society is still stuck at the beginning stages.  Health sector assistance provides the biggest 
boost to voice and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa since it addresses the current 
level of development in the recipients.  Foreign aid for health programs serves to rid the 
population of constant struggles for survival thus allowing citizens to start demanding 
greater rights and freedoms such as education and a political voice.  The only other 
positive aspect of social infrastructure assistance, government and civil society, on voice 
and accountability is to be expected since an increase in funding for the administration 
should lead to an increase in government capabilities.  
The ability of social infrastructure aid to target the public's pressing needs explains 
both its positive relationship with democracy and voice and accountability as well as the 
inability of economic infrastructure aid.  Development assistance succeeds by creating 
opportunities for the recipient, and in Sub-Saharan Africa's current funding the trade and 
banking sector does little to provide opportunities for such an underdeveloped population. 
It would be wrong to say economic infrastructure aid does nothing to foster development 
but most of Sub-Saharan Africa is not at the stage where the general population benefits. 
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As Sub-Saharan African states progress, economic sector assistance will begin to become 
more important as larger proportions of the population are directly affected by 
commercial markets.
Recommendations
The conclusions from the data analysis offer compelling recommendations on how 
foreign assistance should be administered to Sub-Saharan Africa addressing aid 
specialization and recipient feedback.  Current ODA distribution to Sub-Saharan Africa 
provides sweeping assistance that seeks to alter all aspects of development which is the 
wrong method.  Part of the conversation on foreign aid should focus on the need for 
sector and program specialization so that aid pinpoints the important needs and prevents 
donors from stretching themselves.  The data results support foreign aid specialization 
specifically for social infrastructure and only certain social sectors.  Foreign donors need 
to focus their resources on improving the health of the population through direct 
intervention and increasing the recipient's health care capabilities.  Concentration on 
health assistance allows ODA works to meet the current level of development in Sub-
Saharan Africa ensuring a larger amount of funding for the sectors with the greatest 
benefits.
Foreign assistance needs to be specialized to address the most pressing recipient 
needs which can only be known through effective recipient feedback.  The recipient 
population knows the most important considerations in their state and without this 
knowledge donors just throw money at what they perceive to be most pressing.  Not only 
does feedback provide guidance as to the initial assistance but also can notify donors of 
effective programs that deserve increased funding and those ineffective programs that 
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should be terminated.  Finally recipient feedback is vital to the evolution of the assistance 
as the state develops.  ODA should currently address health concerns in Sub-Saharan 
Africa but once this stage has been achieved the feedback guides the direction into the 
next development stages.
Further Research
The results of the analysis provided some key interpretations and recommendations 
for foreign assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa but also raise some questions that need to be 
addressed.  First current data from Sub-Saharan Africa is very limited and in the future as 
data becomes available important variables can be added to the equation to increase the 
robustness of the results.  Ideally literacy rates, education levels, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, and a host of other socioeconomic indicators would be included in the 
analysis which would ensure all societal aspects are controlled.  Along with adding 
controls, future research should expand the number of assistance programs analyzed to 
determine if there are any other forms of assistance contributing to democracy in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Increasing the number of independent variables and controls permits 
further research to explore foreign assistance at a more granular level.
The final area of further research is to analyze the relationship between foreign 
assistance programs and their specific sectors, which is only accessible through additional 
data.  Even though it was shown health assistance increased the voice and accountability 
in Sub-Saharan Africa it is not known what effect the assistance actually had on the 
health of the population.  Also there is the possibility the results show no relationship 
between health assistance and the health of the population which raises even more 
questions as to what is causing the aid to increase democracy.  A final part of the analysis 
52
involves analyzing the relationship between the different sectors and democracy to 
determine which sectors contribute most to development.  The combination of the 
analysis of assistance on each sector and each sector on democracy would provide the 
most exhaustive conclusions about the foreign assistance and democracy.
Concluding Remarks
Foreign assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa offers one of the most intriguing studies in 
international relations.  The region is one of the most volatile in the world, with ever 
changing political institutions, constant civil strife, and rampant poverty.  The region lags 
behind all other developing regions even though continuous attempts are made to 
democratize and instill progressive reforms.  Western nations and development agencies 
have since the end of colonialism sought to provide the region with economic assistance 
with the intent to spur social and economic development with the end goal of a 
democratic region.  The hope is that as the region's states become more democratic, they 
will provide additional opportunities for the international, regional, and national markets 
as well as increased stability. 
Studies have long desired to determine the effects of foreign assistance in Sub-
Saharan Africa in order to understand its effectiveness.  Understanding the relationship 
between ODA and democracy and development is important to identify the areas of 
positive democratic and development growth due to aid and where it may actually 
diminish opportunities.  Over time the research has progressed from basic analyses of 
ODA and economic growth to ODA and democracy and now needs to become more 
granular into the various forms of ODA and different societal and economic 
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characteristics.  Researchers have been able to begin approaching the more detailed 
analyses as data from Sub-Saharan Africa becomes more available and reliable and as the 
availability of the data grows so too does the research.
This paper's focus is limited in order to capture specific aspects of foreign assistance 
and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to further understand methods of 
assistance.  The results provide insights into where foreign assistance currently succeeds 
and fails, giving guidance for the specialization of future ODA.  The paper makes the 
argument for assistance geared towards social aspects of society as the best method for 
promoting democracy and development.  The results of the analysis back up the 
argument, making the case for drastic changes in foreign assistance allocation in order to 
maximize the benefits while limiting the costs.  Not only do donors need to target specific 
social challenges but also scale back overall assistance as to not stretch themselves to the 
point where they cannot properly assess their actions.  The analysis captures just one 
snapshot of foreign assistance and still fairly high level and only though additional 
measures of socioeconomic characteristics will the research be capable of truly 
understanding the granular relationships between ODA, democracy, and society. 
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Appendix
Model 3: Assumption Tests
Heteroskedesticity
Original Heteroskedesticity Residuals by Population Size
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Table : Model 3 Multicollinearity
Independent Variable VIF 1/VIF
Social Infrastructure Aid 3.68 0.27
Employment to Population 3.06 0.33
Economic Infrastructure Aid 2.31 0.43
Urbananization X Population Density 1.44 0.69
GDP per Capita 1.41 0.71
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Table : Model 4 Multicollinearity
Independent Variable VIF 1/VIF
Social Infrastructure Aid 3.68 0.27
Employment to Population 3.09 0.32
Economic Infrastructure Aid 2.32 0.43
Urbananization X Population Density 1.44 0.69
GDP per Capita 1.41 0.71
Model 6 Assumption Tests
Heteroskedesticity
Original Heteroskedesticity Residuals by Population Size
Corrected Heteroskedesticity
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Multicollinearity
Democratic Sub-Saharan Countries, 2002-2009
Country Year
         Benin 2002
         Benin 2003
         Benin 2004
         Benin 2005
         Benin 2006
         Benin 2007
         Benin 2008
         Benin 2009
      Botswana 2002
      Botswana 2003
      Botswana 2004
      Botswana 2005
      Botswana 2006
      Botswana 2007
      Botswana 2008
      Botswana 2009
       Burundi 2005
       Burundi 2006
       Burundi 2007
       Burundi 2008
       Burundi 2009
       Comoros 2004
       Comoros 2005
       Comoros 2006
       Comoros 2007
       Comoros 2008
       Comoros 2009
         Ghana 2002
         Ghana 2003
         Ghana 2004
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Table : Model 6 Multicollinearity
Independent Variable VIF 1/VIF
Health Aid 4.5 0.14
Education Aid 4.8 0.2
Employment to Population Ratio 4.7 0.21
Economic Infrastructure Aid 4.6 0.22
W ater and Sanitation Aid 4.4 0.23
Population Aid 1.96 0.51
Government Aid 1.85 0.54
Population Density X Urbanization 1.77 0.57
GDP per Capita 1.53 0.66
         Ghana 2005
         Ghana 2006
         Ghana 2007
         Ghana 2008
         Ghana 2009
 Guinea-Bissau 2005
 Guinea-Bissau 2006
 Guinea-Bissau 2007
 Guinea-Bissau 2008
 Guinea-Bissau 2009
         Kenya 2002
         Kenya 2003
         Kenya 2004
         Kenya 2005
         Kenya 2006
         Kenya 2007
         Kenya 2008
         Kenya 2009
       Lesotho 2002
       Lesotho 2003
       Lesotho 2004
       Lesotho 2005
       Lesotho 2006
       Lesotho 2007
       Lesotho 2008
       Lesotho 2009
       Liberia 2006
       Liberia 2007
       Liberia 2008
       Liberia 2009
    Madagascar 2002
    Madagascar 2003
    Madagascar 2004
    Madagascar 2005
    Madagascar 2006
    Madagascar 2007
    Madagascar 2008
        Malawi 2004
        Malawi 2005
        Malawi 2006
        Malawi 2007
        Malawi 2008
        Malawi 2009
          Mali 2002
          Mali 2003
          Mali 2004
          Mali 2005
          Mali 2006
          Mali 2007
          Mali 2008
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          Mali 2009
     Mauritius 2002
     Mauritius 2003
     Mauritius 2004
     Mauritius 2005
     Mauritius 2006
     Mauritius 2007
     Mauritius 2008
     Mauritius 2009
       Namibia 2002
       Namibia 2003
       Namibia 2004
       Namibia 2005
       Namibia 2006
       Namibia 2007
       Namibia 2008
       Namibia 2009
         Niger 2004
         Niger 2005
         Niger 2006
         Niger 2007
         Niger 2008
       Senegal 2002
       Senegal 2003
       Senegal 2004
       Senegal 2005
       Senegal 2006
       Senegal 2007
       Senegal 2008
       Senegal 2009
  Sierra Leone 2007
  Sierra Leone 2008
  Sierra Leone 2009
  South Africa 2002
  South Africa 2003
  South Africa 2004
  South Africa 2005
  South Africa 2006
  South Africa 2007
  South Africa 2008
  South Africa 2009
        Zambia 2008
        Zambia 2009
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